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State of Utah 
VITO TODARO and 
GUISEPPE FONTANA, 
-v:s.-
J. D. GARDNER, 
Appellants, 
Respondent, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 8239 
The Appellants in their Statement of Facts review 
primarily the court proceedings which first occurred in 
the State of Arizona -and subsequntly in the District 
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Court in the State of Utah. In order to n1ore accurately 
understand the contentions of the Respondent, in main-
taining that the cause of action litigated in the State of 
Utah, was a different c:aus·e of action than the one liti-
gated in the Arizona courts and therefore the doctrine 
of res adjudicata i~ not applicable,. a statement of the 
facts and negotiations giving rise to the circumstanee·s 
leading up to the litigation is felt to be necessary. 
Prior to J 1une 27, 1947, Respondent had made pre-
liminary investigations concerning the possib~e purchase 
of building's constructed by thte appellants at Phoenix, 
Ariz. ( R. 18) The buildings had been constructed pur-
suant to priorities issued by federal agencies wherein the 
builders were required to give veterans first priority 
on a monthly rental basis; (R. 68, 71) The buildings were 
built as a series of duplexes ; ( R. 49) however, they were 
susceptible of being used as a motel. (R. 5) On the 27th 
day of June, 1947, the Respondent had negotiations with 
the Appellants and their attorney (R. 19) as result of 
which instructions were given to a Title and Escrow 
Company for the purpose of preparing an Escrow Agree-
ment contemplating a sale of the property. (R. 23) At 
the time of these negotiations the Appellants were being 
pressed by creditors for payments owing on the property 
and were anxious to have US'e of any deposit which 
might be made by the Respondent. (R. 24, 25, 66) The 
Respondent agreed to deposit $5,000.00 to show his good 
faith but refused to sign any docum:ents until he had 
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his attorneys at Salt Lake City and to determine if the 
building could he used as a motel without risk of violat-
ing Government regulations requiring that property be 
given to veterans for rental units on a monthly basis. 
(R. 21, 22) A receipt was prepared by the title company 
for the deposit of the $5,000.00 by the Respondent and 
the Appellant signed this receipt. (R. 26) The form 
used for the receipt was an Earnest :Money Agreement. 
(R. 2G) However, it varied from the usual preliminary 
agreement which is normally signed by the purchaser 
who makes a deposit subject to approval by the sellers. 
(R. 26) In this case the purchaser rnade the deposit but 
refused to sign the agreement and the sellers signed the 
agreement evidencing receipt of the $5,000.00. The Es-
crow Company didn't acknowledge receipt of the money 
since it was paid direct to the seller for immediate pay-
ment of obligations on the property. It is the theory of 
the Respondent that the above transaction constituted 
merely an oral agre'ement to purchase subject to an ex-
press condition precedent. 
The Respondent, after advancing the $5,000.00, made 
further investigation and received information from a 
newspaper that a criminal complaint had been filed 
against the Appellants for violation of the federal reg-
ulations previously mentioned. (R. 27, Ex. D-5) The 
Respondent further conferred with one of his attorneys, 
Mr. Richard L. Bird (R. 28) at Salt Lake City who wrote 
a letter to attorneys in Arizona requesting that they 
further check into the matter of the regulations and the 
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criminal action. (R. 59, Ex. D-13) In addition, the H.e-
spondent and Mr. Lynn S.. Richards went to Phoenix, 
Arizona, and ·after further investigation at the federal 
agencies involved, concluded that the property could not 
he safely operated as a motel free from government 
regulations and advised the attorney for the Appellants 
that no contract could he made and demanded return of 
the $5,000.00. The attorney for the Appellents stated 
he would request a return of the 1noney. (R. 32, 52, 53) 
At no time did the Respondent sign any agreement 
agreeing to purchase the property. The only documnt 
signed was a receipt heretofore mentioned, signed by 
the Appellants acknowledging receipt of the $5,000.00. 
The suit in the trial court in Arizona was based upon 
two counts: The trial court found upon the first C'ount, 
namely, that the R-espondent had loaned the money to the 
Appellants to meet pressing obligations owing on the pro-
perty. (E.x. D-16 page 21) The Supreme Court of the 
State of Arizona reversed the trial court holding that 
the transaction did not constitute a loan and limited 
their decision to that factual determination. (Ex. P-18) 
After the judgment in the trial court in Arizona and 
before a reversal by the Supreme Court, the Respondent 
had received payment by virtue of garnishment proceed-
ings on the trial court judgment. Although the Supreme 
Court had reversed the judgment in favor of the Respon· 
dent, since he had received the $5,000.00, there was no 
need for him to institute a second proceeding in Arizona 
courts· on the correct theory for recovery of his money. 
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The Appellants, however, commenced a suit in Utah 
based upon a minute entry of the trial court ordering 
the Respondent to return the $5,000.00 collected on the 
judgment which had been reversed. This minute entry 
judgment was merely an order of restitution; not based 
upon any trial, and was therefore not an adjudication on 
the rnerits as to which of the parties was ultimately 
entitled to the money. In the Utah action an affirma-
tive defense sets out the foregoing circumstances and 
claims the right to retain the money on the basis that 
no contract was ever made and the funds were advanced 
upon the expressed condition precedent that if the pro-
perty could not be operated as a motel, the money would 
be returned. The Respondent's theory of the facts and 
circumstances, were in practically all respects, substan-
tiated even by the testimoney of one of the Appellants 
who testified in the Utah District Court. Mr. Todaro 
testified: (R. 72) 
"Q. Was anything said about what would 
happen if the deal didn't go through'! 
A. Well, the only thing Mr. Gardner says, 
"If the government has got some restriction on," 
he says, "I will turn it back." 
Q. He said if the government has got some 
restrictions on, he will turn it back~ 
A. "And I will take the money back." He 
says, "I won't go through with the deal." 
Q. If that was so, then you were to give 
him back his money? 
A. Yes." 
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Later, on redirect examination :Jir. Todaro attempted 
to explain that the above conversation was had after 
the money had been paid. But since the court found 
in favor of Respondent and Appellants do not challenge 
the finding, any conflict in the evidence must be resolved 
in favor of Respondent. 
The Appellants do not argue the sufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the trial court's decision that the 
Respondent was entitled to retain the money, but rather 
the appeal is~he sole issue that the judgn1ents of the 
Arizona courts constitute a defense of res judicata to 
any determination of the matter on the merits ·by the 
Utah Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENTS OF THE ARIZONA COURTS 
ON A CAUSE OF· ACTION FOR MONEY LOANED IS 
NOT RES JUDICATA ON A SEPARATE AND DIS-
TINCT CAUSE ·OF ACTION FOR MONEY AD-
VANCED IN CONTEMPLATION OF A SALE OF 
REAL PROPERTY. 
The first three points of the Appellant's brief are 
all based upon the same argument; namely, that the 
court committed error by failing to rule that the judge-
ments of the Arizona C!ourts were res judicata as to 
the cause of ·action raised by the affirmative defense. 
j. 
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For that reason the Respondents will answer the argu-
ments of those points under the single point above men-
tioned. 
To detennine if res judicata is a defense in this 
action and to better understand the arguments of the 
parties, the scope of the Arizona decision should be 
clearly understood. 
· The judgment of the Arizona trial court was entered 
in favor of the Respondent and against the Appellants 
on the first cause of action which was for rnoney loaned. 
(D-16 H-12) Part of the decision of the Arizona Sup-
reme Court is as follows : 
'The sole question to be detennined in this 
case is whether the evidence substantiates plain-
tiff's cause of action for money loaned. ox, ':~ *" 
"A careful and close analysis of the plain-
tiff's testimony shows that he nowhere testified 
directly to having rnade a loan. The sum and 
substance of his testimony is to the effect that he 
had orally agreed to purchase the property; that 
all of the terms and conditions had been agreed 
upon except one, * * *" 
''It must be remembered that the judgment 
under consideration is predicted solely on a com-
plaint for money loaned. 'l_1he cause of action is 
not for a rescission of the contract and was not 
tried on that theory, and did not seek the return 
of the $5,000 on this basis. * * *" 
"Plaintiff having failed to produce any direct 
testimony or any testimony from which an infer-
ence might be reasonably drawn to substantiate 
the theory of a loan, we are compelled to hold that 
the judgment is wholly unsubstantiated by a:ny 
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competent evidence. Undoubtedly the trial court 
was influenced by the fact that the defendents, 
some days after the abandonment of the contract 
by plaintiff, were able to and did sell the court 
for $210,000 but upon different tenus. Counsel 
have also argued that it would he unfair and in-
equitable to allow defendents to retain the money 
upon the theory that such retention would co~­
stitute an unjust enrichment. This argument 
has no place here because such a suggestion would 
have to be predicated upon the theory of a con-
tract and its rescission. vV e are not here con-
cerned with the rights of a purchaser in a con-
tract for the sale and purchase of land where the 
right of rescission is cl'aimed or the attempt is 
made to avoid a forfeiture. Plaintiff basis his 
right to recover the $5,000 here involved and the 
judgment of the trial court was based solely upon 
the ground of a loan to defendents. As above 
pointed out, this claim is wholly unsupported by 
the plaintiff's evidence though giving it, and all 
re·asonahle inference to be drawn therefrom, full 
faith and credit. 
"The judg1nent of the lower court is reversed 
and the cause remanded to the trial with direc-
tions to enter judgment for the defendant. * * *" 
From the judgment of the trial court and the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the only issue 
adjudicat~d and determined by those decisions was 
whether the Respondent was entitled to the return of 
the money on the theory of money loaned. The trial in 
the Utah District Court was on a completely different 
theory, namely, that no contract was made or consum-
mated,· that funds were advanced in anticipation of the :·b. 
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purchase of property for a motel upon an expressed 
condition precedent. There was never any written agree-
ment signed by the Respondent. The Appellant in his 
testimoney virtually admitted that the money was 
advanced subject to the Respondent satisfying himself 
that the properties could be operated as a motel free 
and clear of any government regulations to the con-
trary. It is the contention of the Respondent that the 
adjudication of these issues constitutes a separate cause 
of action. 
A distinction should be made between a whole or 
different cause of action and component issues or parts 
of the same cause of action. There is no serious argu-
ment with the citations of authorities and the proposi-
tion stated by the Appellants in their br~~ _t~9-t all issues 
of a cause of action which may, can, o~be litigated 
in a trial, must be so litigated, and that a decision on 
the merits as to that cause of action is a bar to any 
further attempt to relitigate any such issues; however, 
the rule of law is substantially different where the cause 
of action, even though based upon the same facts, is 
different in the second suit or trial. 
In reply to the first three points of Appellents brief 
the Respondent submits that there is only one essential 
issue for determination by the court, namely, do the 
judgements rendered by the Arizona Courts constitute 
res judicata as to the affirrrrative defense, set off, or 
counterclaim interposed by the Respondent. It will be 
conceded at the outset that if the affirmative defense, 
set off, or counterclaim as interpos-ed by the Respondent 
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1s the same cause of action as has been litigated in 
Arizona, it would be res judicata and the Utah Courts 
would be required to give full faith and credit to the 
Arizona decisions. On the other hand, if the issues 
raised in the set off, affirmative defense, or counter-
claim are different and constitute a different cause of 
action, then it would not be res judicata and the full 
faith ·and credit clause of the Federal Constitution would 
have no application. 
In the Appellants brief numerous quotations from 
both American Juris prudence and Corpus Juris Secun-
dum were set out. Respondents respectfully submits 
these additional quotations from those authorities should 
be cited. 
· 30 Am. J ur. 9'46, Judgments, Sec. 210: 
"The doctrine of res judicata is not available 
as a bar to a subsequent action if the judgment 
in the fonner action was rendered because of a 
misconception of the ren1edy available or of the 
proper form of proceeding. In such situation, 
the plaintiff is entitled to bring the proper pro-
ceeding to enforce his action." 
50 C. J'. S., Judgments, Sec. 649, Theory of Action 
or Recovery: 
"Where plaintiff is defeated in an action 
based on a certain theory of his legal rights or 
as to the legal effects of a given transaction or 
state of facts through failure to substantiate his 
view of the case, this will not as a rule preclude 
him fron1 renewing the litigation, without any 
change in the facts, but basing his claim on a new 
and more correct theory. It has been held that 
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this rule applies where plaintiff ':~< * * in the sec-
ond suit * * * alleges a different ground of 
liability on the part of defendant, where he fails 
to establish defendant's liability under a 'vritten 
instrument, and afterward seeks recovery as on 
a resulting trust or on the ground of fraud or 
1nistake, where, having failed to establish a spec-
ific lien on property, he sues again on the ground 
of the personal liability of defendant; where, 
having sued for the price of property and failed 
to prove a sale, he brings a new action for its 
use or detention; where an unsuccessful attempt 
to enforce a liability under a statute is followed 
by an action to hold the same defendant liable 
on the same facts as at common law or vice versa; 
where the two actions are brought under different 
statutes; or where, after an adverse decision in 
an action brought under state law, plaintiff sues 
in the state court under a federal law. A similar 
rule as to the right to bring a second action on a 
different theory obtains in equity; where .the 
equities of a second bill are materially different 
from the first, although the origin of both is the 
saine, the adjudication of the first is no bar to 
the second." -;, 
In Utah-Idaho Central Railway Company vs. Indus-
trial Commission, 84 Utah 364, 35 Pac. 2nd 842, 94 A. 
L. R. 1423, the Utah Supreme Court quoted with approval 
:from an Indiana case as follows: 
"A party who imagins he has two or more 
remedies, or who misconceives his rights, is not 
to be deprived of all remedy hecause he first 
tries a wrong one; which is not inconsistent with 
his true and effectual remedy, which he should 
have pursued in the first. i~stance . ( Citi11g Au-
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thorities.) Election of remedies is the act of 
choosing between the different modes of pro-
cedure and relief allowed l1Y law on the same 
state of facts, which modes ·may be term1'd co-
existing remedies. (Citing Text.) rrhe result of 
appellee's first action led hjn1 where he was in 
the first instance, and his present action to en-
force his only ren1edy is not inconsistent there-
with." 
"In either case he had no chance of any other 
existing rernedy. That he in the first instance 
and on the facts misconc<:j\'ed the remedy, and 
pursued one which the law did not afford him, 
did not thereafter bar or estoppe him on the 
same facts from pursuing the only legal. remedy 
that in the first instance was open to him." 
. In Welsh, Driscoll & Buck vs. Buck, 64, Utah 579,232 
P'8..G·• ~li, the court held that a judgnient, in a foreclosure 
suit against an estate, dismissing the suit for want of 
equity; because the instrument sued on as a mortgage 
·was 11ot such in fact, was not a bar to a later assertion 
of such claim in the Probate Court. In so doing the court 
stated: 
"The plaintiffs had erroneously taken the 
view that they held a mortgage, which they 
sought to establish and foreclose and thereby 
satisfy. their claim. There is ample authority to 
the effect that, where a mistake had been made 
in the pursuance of a ren1edy, such a mistake is 
not a bar to the presenting of proper action." 
(Citation of Authorities) 
The. case of Detroit Heating and Lighting Company 
-vs. Stevens 20 Ut. 241, 58 P. 193 also holds in accordance 
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:More recntly the Utah Supreme Court in Commercial 
Bank of Spanish Fork vs. Spanish Fork Southern Irri-
gating Company, 107 Utah 279, 152 Pac. 2nd 547, held 
that a prior Inandamus suit seeking to compel the defend-
ants to recognize the plaintiff as a stockholder wherein 
it was held that the stock certificate was void did not 
bar the subsequent suit to recover damages resulting 
from the issuance of the void certificate stating the rule 
previously entunerated to the effect that "The fact that 
a party by mistake invokes a remody not available to 
him under the facts of the case will not prevent him from 
pursuing a proper remedy which is available." 
Since our courts are only required to give to an 
Arizona decision the same effect as would the Arizona 
courts, it is submitted that the Arizona cases would not 
hold that the prior decisiqn is res judicata, but rather 
the Arizona law is in conformity with the law of Utah 
as stated above. A brief review of some of the Arizona 
cases is as follows: 
Williams vs. Williams, 256 Pac. 356, 32 Ariz. 164. 
rrhis was an action to secure the second foreclosure of 
the same mortgage, on the same property, differing from 
the first foreclosure in the respect that the Grantee of 
the mortgagor was not 1nade a party to the first fore-
closure. Subsequent to the first foreclosure the plaintiff 
brought a suit to quiet title against the present defendant, 
which suit was concluded against the plaintiff. rrhe plain-
tiff in his present complaint set out the two prior actions 
showing incomplete relief, since the present defendant 
was not made a party to the first suit and in the second 
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suit -because of an ilnproper choice of remedies. In the 
present action the court set aside the first foreclosure 
proceedings and granted a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff. The defendant asserted that the prior quiet 
title proceedings between the parties was res judicata 
as to this suit. The court in overruling this defense of 
the· defendant stated as follows: 
"The . plea of estoppel by the judgment in 
the action to quit title is not good for the reason 
that the jssues in that case are not involved in 
this. The· action to quit title was an assertion or 
·contention by plaintiff that his foreclosure against 
the mortgagor and the sale threunder, followed . 
. by; sheriff's, deed, give him title· as against the 
mortgager's grantee, :Mattie L. Williams. This 
proposition was unsound, as the law is well settled 
that a grantee· of the mortgagor n1ust be made 
.. a party defendant in·· the foreclosure before her 
interest can be taken fron1. her or subjected to 
a sale for the .payxnent of the mortg·age debt. This 
suit is an admission of tluit fact and seeks, not 
to question :Mattie L. vVilliams' title to a one-
half interest in. lot 23, but ·to subject it in a legal 
way to the payment of the mortgage debt. It 
admits·· her title. In the action to quiet title the 
questl.on as to whether plaintiff's xnortgage had 
been paid and satisfied by reason of the first 
foreclosure was not- involved. It was apparent 
that the. Inortgage debt still subsisted, so for as 
defendent Mattie L. Willimns' interest was con-
cerned, and in a proper proceeding, such as this, 
could be foreclosed~ The issue· here was not in 
·that·· case and could not have been therein deter-
. mined ... The causes of action. in the two cases are 
different. and _the: parti~s. ar~. no~ the- same. 
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:Morgan vs. Barrett, 17 Ariz. 376, 153 P. 449; 
Harrison vs. Remington Paper Co. (C. C. A.) 
140 F. i}.l.\5, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas. 
314; 15 R. C. L. 964, Sec. 439. 
vVe quote as applicable to the fads of this 
case, fron1 34 Corpus Juris, 798, as follows: 
'The estoppel extends only to the exact point 
raised by the pleadings and decided, and does 
not operate as a bar to a second suit on other 
claims or issu.es, or against other parties.'" 
O'Niel vs. Martin, 182, Pac. 2d 839, 66 Ariz. 78. The 
Court quoted with approval part of Section 172, 30 
Am. Jur. Judgments Section 172, part of which is as 
follows: 
·• A final judgment rendered by a eourt of 
competent jurisdiction, on the merits, is conclu-
sive as to the rights of the parties and their 
privies, and as to them constitutes on absolute 
bar to a subsequent action involving the same 
claim, de1nand, and cause of action. If, however, 
the two suits do not involve the san1e claim, 
demand, and cause of action, such effect will 
not be ordinarily given to the prior judgment. In 
this respect, it is worthy to notice that there must 
be not only identity of subject matter, hut also 
of the cause of action, so that a judgment in a 
forrr1er action does not perate as a bar to a sub-
sequent action, where the cause of action is not 
the same, although each action relates to the same 
subject matter." 
Dowdy vs. Calvi, 125 Pac. 873,. 14 Ariz. 148. rrhe 
court in denying a plea of abatement urged by reason 
of -~ prior suit, stated as follows: 
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"Both pleas are bad when attacked hy a 
demurer, because, as a general rule, 1noney is not 
replevia;ble property, and where such suit was 
commenced therefor its pendency or disposition 
adverse to plaintiff does not affect his right to 
pursue a valid remedy for its c'onversion. Lovell 
vs. Hammond Co., 66 Conn. 500, 34 Atl. 511." 
Lee vs. Johnson 216 Pac. 2d 722 (Ariz. 1950). As 
to the issue of whether a prior suit involving the property 
in question was res judicata in the present action the 
Qo"Qrt stated as follows: 
"In the prior decisions we have pointed out 
the distinction between the effect of a judg-
ment operating by way of ·estoppel in a later 
action upon a different cause of action and 
. a judgment operating by way of a bar against 
a second action upon the sa1ne cause of action. 
Both are frequently referred to as res judicata. 
Lauderdale vs. Industrial Commission, 60 Ariz. 
443, 139 Pac. 2d 449. Before a prior judgment 
n1ay bar a subsequent suit between the same 
parties or their privies, there 1nust be an identity 
not only of the subject 1natter but also of the 
cause of action. This being a suit upon a pos-
sessory cause of action, the prior judg1nent quiet-
ing title is not a bar to the present suit.'' 
Pinkerton vs. Pritchard 223 Pac. 2nd 933, 71 Ariz. 
117. The second suit involved the same parties and con-
cerned the same strip of land. The court concluded that 
the first suit was in ejectment and the present suit was 
in trespass. In the first suit ther.e was a determination 
that one of the parties had an easement over the property ~:1 
owned by the other for roadway purposes. Now the sec-
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ond suit is brought to determine if the easmnent can be 
used for storage and other purposes. 'rhe Trial Court 
in the present suit granted a motion for dismissal of the 
case upon the grounds of res judicata and entered judg-
ment accordingly. 
Upon appeal the Supreme Court set out extensively 
the pleadings i:h the first suit and then concludes that 
the two causes of action were different and in doing so 
stated as follows: 
"But counsel for defendant says these ob-
structions were there on this trip wh~n the former 
case was tried and that these facts should have 
been presented to the court at that time and that 
under the rule laid down by this court i11 numer-
ous decisions all matters in issue, or whieh could 
have been in issue, are conclusively settled by the 
judg1nent in that cause. This is undoubtedly the 
law in this state. ·Citizen State Bank vs. Mc-
Roberts, 29 Ariz. 173, 239 Pac. 1028. But the 
question as to what use defendant Pritchard was 
putting the property at the time of the former 
trial was not a material issue in that case. It was 
wholly immaterial there whether he was using 
it as a junkyard, as a sto~age place or as a vege-
table garden or whether or not he was putting 
it to any use whatsoever. It was granted defen-
dant was wrongfully withholding its possession 
frmn plaintiff and was then asserted he was the 
owner in fee too. That was the sole issue in that 
case." 
The Supreme Court then reversed the decision of 
the Trial Court even though, as a dissenting judge stated: 
"'Jlhey have virtually re-written the judg-
ment entered in the first suit and have read into 
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the cornplaint in the instant action rnaHers which 
no wise appear therein.'' 
After reading the decision rendered in the former 
suit between the parties involved in this action, one can 
only conclude that the Supreme Court of Arizona went 
to great lengths to reverse the Trial Court as against 
the present Respondent and technically and narrowly 
construed the pleadings and the decision to support such 
revers~al. Espec~a:lly is this true after reading the de-
cision in Pinkerton vs. Pritchard, supra, where the con-
verse approach was applied. In any event the present 
Appelants have not shown on what basis they are entitled 
to the money. They did not show in the prior action that 
they had ~a con'tract whi~h entitled them to forfeit the 
down payment, they did not show that there was even a 
contract. They did not show that even if there were a 
contract, there had been a breach of that con~tract on the 
partof theRespondententitlingthem to retain the money, 
ri·or have they shown any other grounds or basis by which 
they should be entitled to recover the money, and they 
apparently are unwilling to challenge the holding of the 
tria:l court on the merits. 
Some of the recent decisions from other jurisdictions 
~upportingthe rule of law quoted above are as follows: 
In Orminski vs. Highland Electrical Supply Co., 62 
N. E. 2d 14, 326 Ill. App. 392, the appellate court state as 
follows: 
''The federal court having held on defend-
ant's motion that the ~air Lahor Standards Act 
did not cover plaintiff's employment, the judg-
ment entered is res judicta as to his right of ac-
tion under the act. lt is conclusive on the question 
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of ~he applicability of that statute, but not of any 
clmm for overtime independent of the statute. 
'The doetrine of res judicta is not available as a 
bar to a subsequent action if the judgment in the 
forn1er action was rendered because of a miscon-
ception of the remedy available***' 30 Am. Jur., 
Judgments - 210, citing, wi'th many other cases 
in federal and state courts, Schenck v. State Line 
Telephone Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 311, 312, 144 N. E. 
592, 593, 35 A. L. R. 1149, Where Justice Cardoza 
said : 'The plain tiff thought he had a remedy at 
law, and so thinking sued for damages. In truth 
he had no such remedy, for, irrespective of his 
knowledge of the fraud, his right of action for 
damages had been barred by lapse of time. The 
defendants have blocked his recourse to a remedy 
which he had not. Thev now say that because of 
his mistake, he must be held to have renounced 
forever the remedy he had. 'There would be no 
sense or principle in such a rule.' Holmes, J., 
in Snow v. Alley, supra (156 Mass. 193, 30 N. E. 
691)." 
''The situation presented here is analogous 
to that involved in Pillsbury v. Early, 324 Ill. 562, 
155 N. E. 475. There plaintiff brought suit for 
the specific performance of an alleged oral agree-
Inent of the decedent, John Early, to give to pl:ain-
tiff at his death the farm on which decedent and 
his parents were living in consideration of plain-
tiff's services in caring for decedent and his par-
ents; this bill was dismissed for want of equity; 
plaintiff filed her claim in the Probate Court 
against decedent's estate, claiming the reasonahl(• 
value of the services rendered by her; the claim 
was allowed. In overruling the defense that the 
decree in the chancery suit was res judicta as to 
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all matters involved in the claim·against the es-
. tate, the Supreme Court ~aid (324 Ill. at pag·e 
565, 155 N. E. at page 477): '***where the former 
adjudication is relied on a~ an answer and a bar 
to the whole cause of action, it must appear that 
the things sought to be r<'C'OYered and the cause 
of action in both :-;nits are the same (Hanna v. 
Read, 102 Ill. 596, 40 Ain. Rep. 608; Sulurian Oil 
Co. v. Neil, 277 Ill. 45, 115 N. E. 114), and that 
the former judgment necessarily involved the de-
tennination of the same fact, to prove or disproYe 
which it is offered in evidence (\Vells v. Robert-
son, 277 Ill. 534, 115 ~. E. 654.) The issues in the 
chancery case and in the instant case were not the 
same.'' 
In Lorang v. Flathead Commercial Company, 119 
Pac. 2d 273, 112 Mont. 146, the plaintiff to the second 
suit brought the first action alleging an expressed contract 
(oral). wherein he claimed that the defendant agreed to 
pay him $175.00 per month together with a reasonable 
p.ercentage of the net profits earned in the store operated 
by defendant. On the trial of the first case, after all of 
the evidence was introduced, the court sustained a motion 
for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant on the 
grounds that the parties had not Agreed upon a definite 
rate of compensation. In the second action the defendant 
urged the prior judgment as being res judicata. Con-
cerning this issue the court on appeal stated as follows: 
"Assurning, without so deciding, that the 
judgment in action No. 8936 was and is a bar to 
another act!on to enforce the express contract, it 
was not' a bar to the maintenance of this· action 
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which was brought to recover on a quantum 
meruit. The general rule applicable is stated in 
34 C. J. 806, as follows: 'Where a plaintiff is 
defeated in an action based on a certain theory 
of his legal rights or as to the legal effects of a 
given transaction or state of facts through failure 
to substantiate his view of the case, this will not 
as a rule preclude him from renewing the liti-
gation, without any change in the facts, but basing 
his daim on a new and more correct theory.' To 
the same effect is 30 An1. Jur., Judgments, ~ection 
210, page 946. And the author in 34 C. J., at page 
807, states: 'The gene~al rule that a judgment 
for defendant will not bar a subsequent action bv 
plainb.ff based on a new and more correct theory 
applies where plaintiff, in an action to recover 
on an express contract for services to be rendered 
or goods to be furnished, has been defeated on 
the ground that the contract was invalid, or was 
not proved, or had not been fully performed.' 
The court properly heid that the judgment in 
case No. 8936 is not a bar to the maintenance of 
this action.'' 
In Hansen v. Jones, 115 Colo. 1, 168 P. 2d 263, the 
plaintiff b~ou~ht ,an action for money had and received 
against numer,ous defendants including A. J. West, Presi-
dent of the defendant hank. Prior to this action the 
plaintiff had sued A. J. West for conversion of personal 
property and a judgment of dismissal was entered in 
that action. The judgment in part provided as follows: 
"That the evidence is totally lacking in any-
thing which connects the defendant with posses-
sion, dorninion or control of the cattle or the s~ale 
there.of. The defendant had control over the pro-
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ceeds, the price received at the sale. It may be 
that there was a eonersion of money. If there was 
a conversion of anything it was of the price and 
not of the cattle and the plaintiff cannot recover. 
Let judgment enter dismissing the cause." 
The def.endant in the subsequent action introduced 
the prior judgment as res judicata as to him. On this 
particular point the court states as f'ollows: 
"Upon the face of the decision in the former 
case, it would seem that the judgn1ent of dismissal 
was rendered because of plaintiff's misconception 
of the remedy available, and, in effect, was with-
out prejudice to his right to sue for the proceeds. 
In such circumstances plaintiff was 'entitled to 
bring the proper proceedings to enforce his cause 
of action.' 30 Am. J ur., p. 946, section 210" 
The court also ,state: 
. ''Under conditions somewhat analagous, we 
have lJ.eld, upon the principle first mentioned, that 
the dismissal on the merits of a cause of action 
upon an expressed contract was not a bar to the 
institution of a new action upon an implied con-
tract or upon quantum meruit.'' (Citation of Au-
thorities). 
In Maine vs. Losser Auto Exchange 129 So. 533, 10 
La. App . .65 the plaintiff had brought a prior action 
against the same defendant wherein the plaintiff alleged 
that he had sold the car to the defendant, and he sought 
to recover the purchase price. In the prior action the 
decision was given for the defendant. The plaintiff then 
instituted· an action on the grounds tha:t the defendant 
was iiable to the plaintiff as a bailee. The defendant 
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urged 'as a defense res judicata ·and estoppel. The court 
in discussing these defenses stated as follows: 
''A reading of the decision in that suit shows 
that this court did not pass upon the question of 
whether defendant 'vas liable as bailee, and based 
its refusal to hold defendant liable solelv on the 
grounds that a Contract of Sale was all~ged but 
not proven. This court said: 'The plaintiff's 
counsel argues that the defendant is liable to him 
as a depository or broker because he failed to 
take proper precautions for the safety of his prop-
erty. \Vithout discussing the n1erits of this con-
tention we observe that it is a totally different 
cause of action from that set out in plaintiff's 
· petition and inconsistent herewith ***." 
' 'It is plain, then, that since, in that case, the 
liabilitv vel non of defendant as bailee was not 
considered, ·and since the question of whether or 
not there is liability as bailee is the only question 
presented here, the first suit does not constitute 
res judicata.'' 
In Go1dsmith-Leslie Co. v. Whitehead, 152 S. E. 589, 
41 Ga. App. 287 a suit in Trover to recover property from 
a eonditional purchaser was not barred by previous 
judgment on purchase-money notes. 
In Hanson v. S. & L. Drug Co., 212 W. 731, 203 Iowa 
384 the plaintiff was required to elect he'tween open ac-
·count or account stated and elected to stand on account 
stated, 'and it wa;s held that the judgment denying re-
covery was not a bar to a subsequent action on open 
accDunt. 
In in re Geagen 's Estate, 41 A. 2d 213, 136 N. J. eq. 
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239 a judg-ment of nonsuit in an action at law against 
an administrator ·based on fraud in administration of es-
tate was not res judicata in subsequent proceedings in 
orphans' court to hold adminis•trator liable to estate for 
depletion 'there·of resulting from his negligence in carry-
ing out duties as administrator. 
In Burke v. Willard, 144 N. E. 223, 249 Mass. 313 a 
judg1nent for defendant tenant in action by nwrtgagee to 
recover for use and occupation, on ground that defendant 
wws a ·tenant at sufferance, did not bar a subsequent ac-
tion by mortgagee in tort to recover mesne profits accru-
ing after entry, on theory that tenant was trespasser. 
In Adams v. Powell, 142 So. 537, 225 Ala. 300 a dis-
Inissa;l of wife's heirs' suit, seeking specific perforn1ance 
on 'theory that wife purchased land from husband was 
not res judicata of suit to quiet title by same heirs on 
theory transaction con:stituted equitable mortgage. 
The Appellants quote ext~nsively from a motion and 
argument for a rehearing filed with the Arizona Supreme 
Court and then argue that since the petition advances 
the same theory as the one tried in the Utah District 
Court, the denial of the petition constitutes an adjudica-
•ti.on of that theory. Such is not the case. No opinion 
was written in denying the petition. 
A denial of a petition for rehearing does not adjudi-
cate. the is~ues ar~ed in the petition. Such a petition 
suggests that the decision of the Court is wrong and 
should be reconsidered. The denial of th_e petition af-
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firms the original holding as being the court's final de-
crsion. The Arizona Court in denying the petition f.or 
rehearing merely affirms that the court did not err in 
holding that the action was solely to recover money 
loaned. The decision and rule of the court, therefore, 
is contained in their written decisron. To determine the 
extent and the effect of the holding of· the Arizona Su-
preme Court one must look to its wri1tten decision which 
clearly states that the sole issue for determination is 
one of whether the record will support a cause ·of action 
for money loaned. 
Parts of the decisron are as follows : 
''The sole question to be dettermined in this 
case is whether the evidence substantiates plain-
tiff's cause of action for money loaned. ***" 
·'A careflrl and close analysis of the plain-
tiff's testimony shows that he nowhere testified 
directly to having made a loan. The sru11 and sub-
stance of hits testilnony is to the effect that he had 
orally agreed to purcha~e the property; that all 
of the terms and cond~tions had been ~agreed upon 
except one, *** '' 
''It must be remembered that the judgment 
under consideration is predicated solely on a corn-
plaint for money loaned. The cause of action is 
not for a rescission of the contract and was not 
tried on that theory, and did not seek the return 
of the $5,000 on this basis. * * * '' 
''Plaintiff having failed to produce any direct 
testimony or any testimony from which an infer-. 
ence might ~be reasonably drawn to substanrtiate. 
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the theory of a loan, we are em.; pelled to hold that 
the judgment is wholly unsubstantiated by any 
competent evidence. Undoubtc•fllY the trial court 
was influenced hy the fact that· the defendants, 
some sixty days after the abandonment of the 
contract by plaintiff, were able to and did ~ell the 
court for $210,000 hut upon different terms. Coun-
sel have also argued that it would he unfair and 
inequitable to allow defendants to retain the 
money upon the theory that such retention would 
constitute an lmjust enrichment. This argument 
has no place here because such a suggestion would 
have to be predicated upon the theory of a con-
tract and its rescission. "\V e are not here con-
cerned with the rights of a purchaser in a contract 
for the sale and purchase of land where the right 
of recission is clai1ned or the a ttemp't is made to 
avoid a forefeiture. Plaintiff bases his right to 
recover the $5,000 here invofved and the judgment 
of the tria:l court was based solely upon the ground 
of a loan to defendants. As 81hove pointed out, 
this claim is wholly unsupported by the plaintiff's 
evidence though giving it, and all :reasonable in-
ferences to be drawn therefrom, full faith and 
credit. 
"The judgment of the lower court is reversed 
and the cause re1nanded to the trial court with 
disections to enter judgment for the defend-
ant. ***" 
It is obvious from the foregoing decision that the 
holding of. the court merely concludes that the Respond-
ent is not entitled to recover the sum of $5,000 on the 
theory of money l'oaned. The decision specifically ex-
Cludes any intimation as to the results which might he 
seeured upon a retri'al on a different theory. It is further 
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clear from the decision and the facts of the case that 
neither the Respondent nor the Appellant have had ad-
judicated or determined their respective rights which 
reference to the sum of $5,000. The only holding is that 
the Respondent is not entitled to the money on the basis 
of money loaned. 
The Utah trial court found upon the merits of the 
case in favor of the Respondent. The Appellants do 
not challenge such a determination. Since the action is 
not barred by the decision of the Arizona court, the judg-
ment should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED INTEREST TO 
RESPONDENT ON THE $5,000.00 FOR THE PERIOD OF 
TIME THE MONEY WAS \VRONGFULLY \VITHHELD BY 
APPELLANTS. (Reply to Appellants, Point IV) 
The Appellants main contention under P.oint IV is 
that they cannot understand upon what theory the court 
awarded interest. The 0ourt found that the Respondent 
wa;s entitled to have the $5,000.00 deposit returned to 
him aml therefore assessed interest for the wrongful 
withholding of said money for the period of September 
5, 1947 to November 2, 1949. The Appellants on appeal 
have not challanged the court's findings on the factual 
Issues. 
The record shows tha:t on July 14 the Respondent 
with h'is attorney met with the attorney for the Appel-
lants and advised them that the contract could not be 
consummated and demanded a return of the m·oney. (R. 
55) 
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On August 29, 1947 a letter \Yas written to the Ap-
pellant's attorney ag-ain demanding- repaynwnt of the 
$5,000.00. (Ex. P-8) A second letter dated September 
5, 1947 written by the Respondent likewise demanded 
return of the $5,000.00. The court apparently took the 
last date of demand for the purpose of computing in-
tere~st. Two garnishee judgments were entered by the 
Arizona court on the 2nd day of December, 1949 by virtue 
of which Respondent received payment of the $5,000.00. 
Copies of these judgments were introduced, although 
unmarked as an exhibit, as part of the record received 
from the Arizona courts. 
The court having found that the Respondent was 
leially entitled to a return of his $5,000.00, it p:roperly 
awarded damages for the period of time that said money 
was wrongfully withheld, namely, from September 5, 
194 7 to November 2, 1949. Interest was computed at the 
legal :rate of 6 per cent per annum as provided by Sec. 
15-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
It has long been -established in Utah that interest is 
aHowed on debts overdue even in absence of a statute 
or contract providing therefor. Wasatch Min. Co. vs. 
Crescent Min. Co. 7 U. 8, 16 24 Pac. 586 Aff'd 151 U. S. 
317, 38 Lawyers Edition 177, 14 S. CT. 348. 
Even though the Appellants secured an order of 
restitution for return ·of the money, at all times, a~ord­
ing to the holding of the Utah trial court, the Respondent 
had a counter cla~m arid setoff against the judgment for 
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restitution and therefore there would be no offsetting 
amount f'or interest on the Appellants' judgment. 
In view of the court's findings, not ehallenged by 
the Appellants, and the statutes and cases in the State 
of Utah, it is manifest tha:t the court properly awarded 
interest to the Respondents. 
CONCLUSION 
Giving full faith and credit to a decision of a sister 
state is not here involved. The issue is whether the de-
cision of the Arizona court is res judicata. Tl1e deter-
mination of this issue is resolved by determining if the 
same cause of action was litigated by the Utah court. The 
Arizona decision by its very tenns limits itself to an ad-
judication of a cause of action for money loaned. The 
Utah court litigated a different cause of action o.f money 
deposited in contemplation of a written contract to be 
formed after the resolving of a condition precedent. The 
condition precedent was never resolved and therefore 
the Respondent was entitled to have returned to him 
the deposit. The trial court so found. The Supreme 
Court should affirm that decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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